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This thesis argues that Japanese media disproportionately finds United 
States Forces Japan (USFJ) military and civilian personnel and their dependents 
responsible for accidents and crimes. The thesis examines how and why this 
pattern of reporting occurs. 
The thesis first introduces the pattern of disproportionate attribution of 
crime to USFJ and affiliated personnel in Okinawa, then finds that genuine crime 
rates are low even when compared to already low crime rates in the country. The 
thesis situates this media over-attribution pattern in a broader, Japanese-wide 
context of over-attribution of crime to non-Japanese residents. It then discusses 
further explanatory factors rooted in Okinawa’s socioeconomic and political 
circumstances themselves, including not only the perceived disproportionate 
hosting burden that Okinawa shoulders for U.S. military bases, but also political 
and media incentives in Okinawa that lead local political actors to emphasize 
these burdens without fully challenging or removing them.  
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This thesis argues that Japanese media, protest groups on mainland 
Japan and the island of Okinawa, and certain government organizations 
disproportionately find United States Forces Japan (USFJ) military and civilian 
personnel and their dependents responsible for accidents and crimes. The thesis 
examines how and why this pattern of reporting occurs and explores the potential 
negative effect on the U.S.–Japan relationship. 
This topic is important to both American and Japanese interests. The 
U.S.–Japan security alliance is considered the cornerstone of peace and security 
in the Asia-Pacific region, and the Asia-Pacific region is in turn increasingly 
crucial to U.S. interests in general. 
The United States has shifted its focus from protracted engagements in 
Iraq and Afghanistan toward more geostrategic global regions. One such region 
is Asia, where America has pivoted toward using strategic, diplomatic and 
economic components to advance American interests backed by a strong 
forward deployment of U.S. military personnel in that area to rapidly respond to 
both regional and global military and humanitarian crises as required. As noted in 
a Foreign Policy article: 
The Obama administration’s overall posture toward Asia has in fact 
evolved considerably over the course of the past couple of years. 
President Obama laid out the result in its fullest form last month, as 
he traveled to Honolulu, Australia, and Indonesia for a series of 
major meetings. The message of this remarkable trip warrants 
careful examination, as it articulated an integrated diplomatic, 
military, and economic strategy that stretches from the Indian 
subcontinent through Northeast Asia—and one that can profoundly 
shape the U.S.–China relationship. The core message: America is 
going to play a leadership role in Asia for decades to come.1 
 
                                            
1 Kenneth Lieberthal, “The American Pivot to Asia,” Foreign Policy, December 21, 
2011http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/21/the_american_pivot_to_asia?page=0,1. 
 2 
Historically, America has maintained a prolonged interest in East and 
Southeast Asia that primarily consisted of establishing regional military and 
economic allies to meet U.S. strategic and economic needs and goals. The U.S. 
policies and priorities for the Asian region have shifted since World War II, and its 
influence in the region has waned due to various financial crises, the 9/11 
terrorist attack, conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the economic rise and 
military modernization of China, whose increasing stature is of major concern for 
the United States. Other important components for the shift in American policy in 
the region and a cause for change in the U.S.–Japan security alliance are 
accidents and crimes committed by USFJ military and civilian personnel, the 
premise of this thesis.  
Both the United States and Japan share a common vision of a stable 
regional order. This vision was reconfirmed at the conclusion of the U.S.–Japan 
Security Consultative Committee (USJSCC) meeting attended by U.S. Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Gates, Japanese 
Foreign Minister Takeaki Matsumoto and Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi 
Kitazawa on June 21, 2011, when the following joint statement on the U.S.–
Japan Security Alliance was issued: 
The Government of the United States reaffirmed its commitment to 
the defense of Japan and the peace and security of the region, 
including through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, both 
nuclear and conventional. The Government of Japan reaffirmed its 
commitment to provide for the stable use of facilities and areas by 
U.S. forces and to support the smooth operation of those forces 
through the provision of Host Nation Support. The two sides 
welcomed the successful conclusion of a new agreement on Host 
Nation Support as described in the SCC document, “Host Nation 
Support,” issued in the SCC meeting today.2 
 
                                            




The recommitment that the United States and Japan have pledged to one 
another through the USJSCC is dependent upon the forward-deployment of U.S. 
military forces in Asia. The bulk of these forces are now based on the island of 
Okinawa, which serves as a strategic point for the USFJ’s mission to preserve 
regional security and stability.  
Despite this recommitment to the defense of Japan, and Japan’s interest 
in “normalizing” by expanding the roles and capabilities of its Self-Defense 
Forces, the United States finds itself hampered by a seemingly unsolvable issue, 
the burden of Okinawa, commonly known as the “Okinawa Mondai” (Okinawa 
problem) in Japanese. This burden remains not only because of recurring crimes 
and accidents committed by the USFJ personnel, but also as a direct result of 
exaggerated reporting by portions of the Japanese media, particularly on the 
island of Okinawa, which sways public opinion and further exasperates and 
alienates the local populace.  
This commitment is often tested, though, when accidents and crimes, no 
matter how minor, by USFJ personnel occur, especially on Okinawa. Reporting 
of USFJ incidents creates the need to reinterpret, discuss, and reevaluate 
preventive measures to deter such incidents in the future. This thesis argues, 
though, that the notion that USFJ personnel commit a disproportionate amount of 
crime is flawed. Reporting of USFJ incidents thus also creates a need to confront 
reporting inaccuracies that might paint an inaccurately negative picture of the 
U.S. military in Japan. The perception of disproportionate USFJ crime and 
accidents hinders the United States’ efforts to propose and implement practical 
solutions toward sustaining one of America’s most valuable and strategic 
alliances in Asia. It is hoped that thesis’ findings might aid USFJ commanders 
and U.S. policymakers in formulating better-informed responses and policies 
relating to USFJ incidents, toward the end of improving local community relations 
and the U.S.–Japan partnership overall. 
The thesis contributes to current scholarly research and builds upon three 
earlier NPS theses. The first, “The Evolution of Japan’s Constitution and 
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Implications for U.S. Forces on Okinawa,” by Giuseppe A. Stavale, offers 
practical solutions to address the myriad of issues facing the USFJ.3 The second, 
“Comparative Study of Base Community Relations in Japan,” by Jonathan M. 
Volkle, argues that “The level of tension surrounding a given base is determined 
less by major crimes that get the most academic and media attention, but rather 
by pacifist politics and aircraft noise.”4 
The third, “The Effects of Pacifist Norms of the Japanese Justice System,” 
by Andrea J. Zenn, examines the “system of contradictions” in Japan through 
which low-crime rates have come under scrutiny due to claims of falsification, 
underreporting of crimes and reporting procedures.5 
Stavale describes how the OPG undermines the orderly disposition of 
suspected or actual lawbreakers protected by the U.S.–Japan Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA), only later to exploit the situation and play on the emotions of 
the local citizens. The lack of fair and objective reporting by interest groups, 
some politicians and the media perpetrates the often-negative stereotype of the 
“dangerous foreigner.” On the other hand, Volkle argues that: 
However, little effort has been expended on an actual attempt to 
get an objective measurement of the level of tension. Without an 
accurate assessment of the actual level of tension surrounding a 
given facility, it is impossible for policy makers, military officials and 
public affairs professionals to understand whether or not given 
measure are having any effect.6  
Volkle also examines the “normally associated ‘causes’ for base tensions7 
(petty and violent crime, incidents of drunken driving,)” which actually have an 
effect on base tensions. Zenn examines “how effective the Japanese justice 
                                            
3 Giuseppe A. Stavale, “The Evolution of Japan’s Constitution and Implications for U.S. 
Forces on Okinawa” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004). 
4 Jonathan Volkle, “Comparative Study of Base Community Relations in Japan” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012). 
5 Andrea J. Zenn, “The Effects of Pacifist Norms of the Japanese Justice System” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012). 
6 Volkle, “Base Community Relations in Japan,” 2. 
7 Ibid.,10. 
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system has been in responding to these new crime trends and whether or not the 
reliance on pacifist norms have debilitated the country’s ability to maintain law and 
order.”8  
By examining scholarly works, blogs, the three aforementioned NPS 
theses and other published works, and then analyzing the author’s findings with 
available MOJ, OPP and USFJ crime data, this thesis will not only build upon 
previously published literature, but also create a clearer picture of the difficulties 
facing the USFJ.9 The examination of various sources supports the contention 
that USFJ personnel do not commit a disproportionate amount of crime and that 
Japanese media reports and official statistics are often misleading. 
Following Chapter I’s introductory material, Chapter II introduces the 
pattern of disproportionate attribution of crime to USFJ and other SOFA-covered 
personnel in Okinawa. It acknowledges that such crime does, of course, occur in 
Okinawa, but establishes more genuine crime rates and their comparatively low 
levels when juxtaposed even with the otherwise comparative low crime rates of 
Japan. Chapter III situates this pattern in a broader, nationwide context of media 
over-attribution of crime to non-Japanese residents. Chapter IV then discusses 
further explanatory factors rooted in Okinawa’s socioeconomic and political 
circumstances themselves, including not only the perceived disproportionate 
hosting burden that Okinawa shoulders for U.S. bases, but also a dynamic in 




                                            
8 Zenn, The Effects of Pacifist Norms of the Japanese Justice System, 1. 
9 To a lesser extent, this thesis also draws upon the author’s experiences as a U.S. Marine 
stationed at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma during the early 1980s and later, during 
the mid-1980s and early-1990s, as an Interrogator-Translator (Korean and Japanese languages) 
based at Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, and Camp Hansen which both served as backdrops for 
some of the largest base protests on Okinawa, Japan. Being stationed at both bases and 
experiencing demonstrations, curfews and the negative press that often outweighed the positive 
things that accomplished by U.S. Marines, sparked interest in this topic. 
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these burdens. Chapter V concludes, and includes recommendations to help 
change the perception that USFJ personnel commit a greater amount of crime, 
with the expectation that, ultimately, existing fears, tensions or negative beliefs 
about USFJ personnel will be lessened or, better yet, eradicated. A change in 
mindset is one of the most important requirements for solving the Okinawa 
Mondai and improving the U.S.–Japan alliance.  
 7 
II. USFJ CRIME IN OKINAWA—FACT AND FICTION 
A. THE USFJ AND SOFA 
The aim of this thesis is to determine whether the criminal cases chosen 
or presented by the Japanese media or official Japanese sources present a fair 
and balanced portrayal of the USFJ personnel and a factual report of attributed 
incidents. Unfortunately, USFJ military, civilians and their family members 
commit non-penal and penal offenses during on-duty and off-duty hours. Are 
methods used to examine the accidents and crimes correct?  
The USFJ introduces its basic history and current composition as follows: 
Originally established at Fuchu Air Station on July 1, 1957, USFJ, 
with its U.S. Army, U.S Marine Corps, U.S Navy, and U.S Air Force 
elements, consists of approximately 38,000 military personnel, 
43,000 dependents, 5,000 DOD civilian employees, and 25,000 
Japanese workers. U.S. forces are stationed in Japan pursuant to 
the U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960.  
Headquarters U.S. Forces Japan is located at Yokota Air Base. 
Approximately 160 military, DOD civilians, and Japanese national 
employees comprise the Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan’s, 
(COMUSJAPAN) joint staff. The joint staff administers unilateral 
and bilateral defense issues. HQ USFJ focuses on war planning, 
conduct of joint/bilateral exercises and studies, administering the 
Status of Forces Agreement, improving combat readiness, and 
enhancing the quality of life of military and DOD civilian personnel 
and their dependents.10 
Meanwhile, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the 
United States of America and Japan was signed in Washington, DC, on January 
19, 1960.11 This agreement commonly referred to as the Status of Forces 
Agreement or SOFA, consists of 28 articles. Article XVII of the SOFA states:  
                                            
10 U.S. Forces Japan, “About U.S. Forces Japan,” accessed July 11, 2013, 
http://www.usfj.mil/.  
11 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,” accessed August 3, 2012, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html. 
 8 
1. Subject to the provisions of this Article, the military authorities of 
the United States shall have the right to exercise within Japan all 
criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of 
the United States over all persons subject to the military law of the 
United States; the authorities of Japan shall have jurisdiction over 
the members of the United States armed forces, the civilian 
component, and their dependents with respect to offenses 
committed within the territory of Japan and punishable by the law of 
Japan. 
2. The military authorities of the United States shall have the right 
to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military 
law of the United States with respect to offenses, including offenses 
relating to its security, punishable by the law of the United States, 
but not by the law of Japan.12 
B. SOFA-RELATED INCIDENTS AND IMPACTS 
USFJ SOFA-status personnel do sometimes commit crimes on Okinawa 
and in Japan more broadly. It is extremely important to note that any incident 
committed by USFJ SOFA-status personnel, especially U.S. Marines, is one too 
many. In some cases, these crimes have been serious enough, and/or the public 
outcry in the immediate locality has been strong enough, that the incidents have 
become reported and decried nationwide. Some of the more publicized criminal 
cases in the Japanese media and English-language press include: 
 1995: the gang rape of a twelve-year old, sixth-grade Japanese 
school girl by a sailor and two Marines stationed at Camp Hansen13 
 2006: the robbing and beating death of a 56-year-old woman by a 
Yokosuka Naval Base sailor14 
 2008: the stabbing death of a taxi driver by a Yokosuka NB sailor15 
                                            
12 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) website, accessed September 20, 2015, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/sfa/pdfs/fulltext.pdf. 
13 “Americans Charged In Rape in Okinawa,” The New York Times Times, September 29, 
1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/29/world/americans-charged-in-rape-in-okinawa.html. 
14 “Kitty Hawk sailor connected to fatal beating is in Japanese hands,” Stars and Stripes, 
January 9, 2006, http://www.stripes.com/news/kitty-hawk-sailor-connected-to-fatal-beating-is-in-
japanese-hands-1.43351. 
15 Mari Yamaguchi, “US Sailor Arrested in Cab Driver Death,” USA Today, April 3, 2008, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-04-03-5778350_x.htm.  
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 2008: the death of a 17-year-old Kadena Air Base Kubasaki H.S. 
student resulting from DUI 20-year old USFJ dependent16 
 2009: the hit-and-run death of a 66-year-old in Okinawa17 
 2011: the vehicular manslaughter of a 19-year-old Okinawan male 
by 24-year-old Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) 
employee,18 and 
 2012: the rape and robbery of a 20-year-old Okinawan by a 
sailor.19 
Such incidents, alongside less widely-reported ones, have a significant 
impact on political conflict surrounding U.S. military bases and on the broader 
U.S.–Japan alliance. Accidents and crimes committed by USFJ personnel 
protected under the SOFA typically hamper efforts to win local support and 
further strengthen the call for revising the SOFA and removing U.S. military 
personnel and installations from Japan.  
The shocking and heinous incident crimes of kidnapping and gang rape of 
a twelve-year-old Okinawan girl by a sailor and two Marines stationed at Camp 
Hansen in Okinawa in 1995 were arguably the most impactful of all. The incident 
came as “a shock like a typhoon,”20 according to Joseph Nye, former U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The OPG 
lobbied the GOJ to revise the U.S.–Japan SOFA on November 4, 1995 “to 
ensure both the stability of Okinawan lives and regional development.”21 Due to 
                                            
16 Travis Tritten, Stars and Stripes, “Former Okinawa Dependent Charged in Fatal  2008 
Accident,” July 23, 2012, http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/okinawa/former-okinawa-
dependent-charged-in-fatal-2008-accident-1.183718.  
17 David Allen and Chiyomi Sumida Stars and Stripes, “U.S. soldier sentenced to Japanese 
jail for hit-and-run on Okinawa,” October 15, 2010, http://www.stripes.com/news/u-s-soldier-
sentenced-to-japanese-jail-for-hit-and-run-on-okinawa-1.121907.  
18 Travis Tritten and Chiyomi Sumida, Stars and Stripes, “AAFES employee in Japan pleads 
guilty to vehicular manslaughter,” January 23, 2012, 
http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/japan/aafes-employee-in-japan-pleads-guilty-to-vehicular-
manslaughter-1.166592. 
19 USA Today, “U.S. Navy sailors convicted in Okinawa rape,” March 1, 2013, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/01/us-navy-sailors-okinawa-rape/1955873/.  
20. Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press), 
1999.  
21 The Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept, Okinawa Prefectural Government, November, 
1996. 
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the social and political impact of the 1995 gang rape, the United States agreed to 
hand USFJ suspects over to the Japanese before an indictment (sympathetic 
consideration) since the alleged criminal act was severe or heinous in nature. 
Additionally, protests over the gang rape also led to the creation of the 
SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) in 1996 and a U.S.–Japan 
bilateral agreement stipulating the return of 21 percent of the land allocated for 
USFJ installations on Okinawa. The MCAS Futenma land transfer and planned 
relocation to facilities yet to be constructed, for example, is part of a broader plan 
to reassign close to 8,000 Marines to Guam. Although the U.S.–Japan plan is 
considered a positive step in lessening the burden on Okinawa, the economic 
impact that a reduced U.S. military presence may bring looms. 
Former-Director of Security Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Japan, Kevin 
Maher, stated: “It is not a matter of the military, but of an individual,” when 
commenting about the rape, but this view is countered, as expressed by 
Secretary General Seigen Nagayoshi of the Okinawa Human Rights Association, 
by the fact that “many in Okinawa view crime as a structural problem of the U.S. 
military. Even if strict discipline is enforced, crimes will continue unless the bases 
are eliminated. Having coexisted with the U.S. bases for more than 50 years, 
some landowners and several other Okinawans see the presence of U.S. troops 
as a necessary evil.”22  
There is also a more immediate financial impact. Making restitution or 
jidan, is an essential factor for a prosecutor in Japan to decide whether or not to 
institute charges against an individual, according to a Naval Law Review article 
on the U.S.—Japan SOFA.23 Jidan, the cultural practice of making monetary 
compensation to victims of crime in Japan, occurs when a suspect or suspects 
pay a victim or the victim’s family to settle the crime out of court. Settling out of 
                                            
22 Christian Science Monitor, “In Okinawa, ‘Yankee, Go Home’?” August 29, 1996, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/1996/0829/082996.intl.intl.4.html/(page)/2. 
23 Timothy D. Stone, JAGC, USN, “US-Japan SOFA: A Necessary Document Worth 
Preserving,” Naval Law Review, Volume 53, 2006 (accessed September 4, 2015), 
handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA477368. 
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court is often the offender’s first priority. In Japan, as further stated by the article, 
“confession and restitution are used to show remorse and the rehabilitative 
potential of the suspect prior to conviction, and in most cases, prior to the 
initiation of charges.”24 
According to Mizuho Aoki of Japan Times,25 between fiscal year 2004 and 
2013, the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD) reported 9,962 accidents and 
crimes committed by SOFA members. 48 percent of those incidents occurred on 
Okinawa. 21.5 percent (2,138 cases) of the 9,962 incidents were committed 
during on-duty hours and 78.5 percent (7,824 cases) were committed while the 
SOFA member was in a non-duty status.  
Under the terms of the SOFA, the GOJ is obligated to cover 25 percent of 
the compensation awarded to victims of incidents caused while a SOFA member 
is in an official duty status, even if the host nation played no role in the accident. 
The GOJ pays 50 percent in cases where both Japan and the United States 
share responsibility. Japan does not cover compensation for crimes and 
accidents that take place while a service member is in a non-duty status. 
Over the past decade, approximately 2.03 billion yen was paid in 
compensation to victims of accidents caused by U.S. military personnel and 
civilians protected under the SOFA. 74 percent or 1.5 billion yen was paid in 
compensation for on-duty accidents in which the GOJ was responsible to cover 
about 380 million yen. The GOJ did not pay compensation for such crimes as 
rape and robbery committed by SOFA members, according to the MOD. 
 
                                            
24 Ibid., 240 
25 Mizuho Aoki, “Japan paid ¥380 million in compensation for accidents by U.S. military 




C. THE SCALE OF SOFA-RELATED CRIME 
Despite the understandable notoriety of certain severe and politically 
significant crimes, though, SOFA-related crime is comparatively low in Okinawa. 
This is true even when the comparison is to Japanese crime rates that are 
themselves low by international standards. 
Okinawa is home to approximately 75 percent of USFJ facilities. There 
was a population of 1.37 million people in 2006, of which 6,808 were non-SOFA 
status foreign residents. According to Hassett, 4,188 people were arrested for 
penal code offenses and 605 arrested for special law violations.26 Of that group, 
44 non-SOFA foreigners were arrested for penal code offenses and an estimated 
22 for special law violations. This equates to an arrest rate of 0.342 percent for 
Okinawa.27 Meanwhile, among the 42,570 USFJ SOFA-covered individuals in 
Okinawa, there were 63 SOFA personnel arrested for penal code offenses and 
approximately 11 arrested for special law violations (Hassett reported that on-
base arrest data was not released). This represents a 0.174 percent arrest rate 
of USFJ individuals, or nearly half the rate of Japanese arrested in Okinawa 
(0.342) and the whole of Japan (0.351). Perhaps most important, “There were 
zero arrests in Japan of SOFA-sponsored personnel for rape or sexual assault 
during 2006 versus an average of 16 Japanese arrested daily for rape (1,094 
persons) and sexual offenses (4,733).”28 
Similarly, according to the National Policy Agency’s (NPA’s) annual 
criminal statistics released on February 12, 2008, which included incidents on 
Okinawa Prefecture, male USFJ personnel committed 53 crimes per 10,000 
USFJ personnel as compared to the Okinawan male’s 366 crimes committed per 
                                            
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Michael Hassett,  “U.S. Military Crime—SOFA so good?” Japan Times, February 26, 
2008, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/fl20080226zg.html. 
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10,000.29 This represents a USFJ crime rate only 14 percent as large as the 
Okinawan rate. 
In 2009, 8,090 cases of rape and indecent assault were reported to the 
NPA. The results of a study by the Japan Peace Committee reported that the 
indictment rate for crimes, not including vehicular manslaughter, committed by 
USFJ members in Okinawa was 16.2 percent in 2010.30 The national rate in 
Japan was 42 percent for the year-ending 2010, as reported in the Ryukyu 
Shimpo.31 The indictment rate for SOFA personnel committing “ordinary criminal 
offenses” or crimes that exclude negligent driving resulting in injury or death for 
2011 in Japan was 13.3 percent. For Okinawa, the prosecution rate was 22 
percent. 
For a more comprehensive look, Figure 1 provides 20 years of SOFA 
crime statistics involving Okinawa-based SOFA personnel as reported by the 
U.S. Marine Corps Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) in Okinawa. The data provided by 
the SJA reflect Okinawan Prefectural Police (OPP) crime data and other 
information published by the OPP and is available via its website.32 
                                            
29 “在日米軍・沖縄駐留米軍の犯罪率を考える—駄犬日誌,” May 3, 2010, 
http://d.hatena.ne.jp/reservoir/20080214/1202958732. 
30 Mark Ealey, trans., Ryukyu Shimpo, “Low indictment rate for crimes involving U.S. military 
personnel in Okinawa,” August 13, 2011, http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/2011/08/24/2472/. 
31 Ryukyu Shimpo, “Prosecution rate for USFJ personnel’s crime only 13%,” December 1, 
2008, 1. 
32 Okinawa Prefectural Police “U.S. military members, and the like, and general foreign 
arrest situation,” May 24, 2014, http://www.police.pref.okinawa.jp/docs/2015031700025/.  
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Figure 1.  Okinawa SOFA Personnel Off-Base Cases/Defendants 
(Average 1990–2010) (from III MEF SJA, 2011) 
As shown in Figure 1, the average SOFA annual criminal defendant rate in 
Okinawa is 67 defendants, representing all branches of service, in 73 cases tried 
per year based on a twenty-year span of data for the period of 1990–2010. USFJ 
civilians comprised 35.5 percent of all defendants and USFJ military personnel 
comprised the remaining 64.2 percent of defendants during the period shown. 
Figure 2 shows a 1.0 percent increase in the number of opened cases 
Okinawa-wide, but a 6.8 percent decrease in the number of defendants and a 3.7 
percent drop in reported penal code violations from 2010 to 2011. On average 
there were 323 defendants represented in 422 penal-code cases resulting from 
1,034 reported Okinawa-wide crimes monthly during the 2011 timeframe. 
Felonies and violent crimes dropped 28.8 percent and 20.9 percent, respectively, 
during the period. 
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Figure 2.  Okinawa Overall Crime Rate (2010 and 2011) 
(from III MEF SJA, 2011) 
The “Injury through Negligence” falls under the “Other” category and does 
not include traffic offenses or drug offenses. Additionally, according to the Office 
of the SJA, “this chart shows a negative correlation between active patrols and 
actual crime rate. As patrols increase, the number of arrests actually decreases 
due to general deterrence. Conversely, as patrols decrease, the number of 
arrests increases because persons are more likely to commit offenses when no 
police are walking the beat,”33 according to Okinawa SOFA Crime Stats 2011 
presentation material provided by the III MEF SJA.  
According to data from the OPP, shown in Figure 3, Okinawans accounted 
for 98.7 percent of the defendants who committed penal code violations in 2011. 
When compared to the total population of Okinawa, the percentage of people 
committing crimes is relatively low, at 0.27 percent, or 3,876 persons out of a 
                                            
33 Unpublished Okinawa SOFA Crime Stats 2011 presentation materials, SJA, USMC, 
Okinawa, Japan. 
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population of 1,404,878. Of that, 51 USFJ SOFA-sponsored defendants made up 
of military, civilian employees and contractors committed 1.30 percent of the 0.27 
percent of the Okinawa-wide crimes.  
 
 
Figure 3.  SOFA Member Percentage of Overall Okinawa Crime Rate 
(2010 and 2011) (from III MEF SJA, 2011) 
Overall, in 2011, there were 281 fewer penal code violations committed 
Okinawa-wide and 20 fewer SOFA-sponsored personnel charged with penal 
code crimes than the year prior. Key changes were a 67 percent decrease in the 
number of defendants for violent crimes and a 48.3 percent decrease in 
larcenies.  
As shown in Figure 4, in the three-year span of 2009–2011, the number of 
Marine Corps Installations Pacific (MCIPAC) and the Third Marine Expeditionary 
Force (III MEF) off-base defendants dropped 55.3 percent from 53 to 29 persons.  
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Figure 4.  MCIPAC/III MEF Off Base Defendants (2009–2011)  
(from III MEF SJA, 2011) 
The most significant statistics are a significant decrease in violent crimes 
committed by USFJ military personnel when comparing 2011 to 2009 data and 
almost triple the number of larcenies committed in 2010 as compared to 2009. 
The number of larcenies subsided in 2011 to 12 larcenies committed, one more 
than the 2009 figure. Prior to November 23, 2010, the number of larcenies 
committed by U.S. Marine Corps personnel in Okinawa stood at 11. The increase 
in larcenies is attributed to one incident involving seven lower-enlisted Marines 
who allegedly took 8,757-yen worth of goods (a hair dryer, a towel, an electronic 
pot, a table lamp, and two pairs of slippers) from a Naha hotel in Okinawa, 
according to information presented by the SJA. 
In the category of traffic accidents, overall in Japan (Figure 5), according 
to National Police Agency’s Crime in Japan 2010 Annual Report, there were 
725,773 traffic accidents, with 896,208 persons being injured and 4,863 deaths, 
of which 287 were due to drunk drivers. 
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Figure 5.  Trends in the Number of Traffic Accidents Occurrences, 
Fatalities, Injuries and Automobile Ownership (1966–2010) (from III 
MEF SJA, 2011) 
When comparing the U.S. Marine Corps III MEF/MCIPAC statistics for the 
year 2010 (Figure 6) to the NPA’s 2010 annual report, there were 197 traffic 
related incidents in which 98 were instances of drivers charged with “negligent 
driving with injury.” Forty-three III MEF/MCIPAC members were cited for 
speeding in 2010 as compared to 2,368,222 persons nationwide. 
 
Figure 6.  III MEF/MCIPAC Off-Base Penal and Non-Penal Code 
Offenses (2009–2011) (from III MEF SJA, 2011) 
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Forty-seven III MEF/MCIPAC members were charged with Driving Under 
the Influence (DUI) as compared to 848 persons charged with drunken driving 
and 38,925 charged with DUI Japan-wide. Since the U.S. Marine Corps, as well 
its sister services, takes a zero tolerance policy on drinking and driving, the III 
MEF/MCIPAC rate of traffic incidents remains extremely low. 
Figure 7 shows the proportional calculations of defendants under SOFA 
and the local national population in Okinawa for the years 2010 and 2011. SOFA-
status crime was compared with the local population from the macro-level to the 
micro-level.34 
 
Figure 7.  Comparison to Local Population (2010 and 2011) 
(from III MEF SJA, 2011) 
At the time of calculation (FY-11, Q1), SOFA personnel comprised 
approximately 3.5 percent of the population of Okinawa, which represents a 
minimal 1.3 percent of all defendants. These defendants represented less than 
                                            
34 The USFJ Okinawa Area Field Office provided the total SOFA personnel strength, which 
reflects the first quarter of fiscal year 2011 (FY11, Q1). Military and dependent strength figures 
were provided to the SJA by the III MEF Public Affairs Office and the civilian strength obtained 
from the Civilian Human Resource Office, Marine Corps Base Camp Butler, Okinawa, Japan. The 
Okinawa local population figures are derived from 2011 census data. Okinawa local percentages 
were obtained by dividing the total number of defendants by total population and then multiplying 
by a hundred. 
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0.5 percent of the overall 0.27 percent of local nationals who were charged in 
penal and non-penal cases in Okinawa. 
Additionally, 0.102 percent of the total SOFA population were defendants 
during this timeframe, and overall, to further emphasize the point that USFJ 
personnel do not commit a disproportionate amount of crime in Japan, 
particularly on Okinawa, SOFA defendants totaled 0.005 percent of total 
Okinawan population according to data provided by the SJA, as was shown in 
Figure 7. Therefore, comparisons between the III MEF/MCIPAC defendant rate 
and that of the local population seem to support the idea that U.S. Marine Corps 
service members, civilians and their dependents do not commit a 
disproportionate amount of crime.  
In looking at the number of SOFA personnel accused of crimes on 
Okinawa as reported during the first quarter of 2015, Stars and Stripes reported 
that “U.S. service members, family members and civilian workers accused of 
committing crimes on Okinawa dropped to the lowest level since 1972.”35 27 
SOFA members were arrested out of a prefecture-wide total of 3,410 in 2014. 
There were 38 SOFA personnel arrested in 2013. As in the previous year, 10 
total SOFA personnel arrested were on active duty, according to the OPP. 
Overall, SOFA members on Okinawa committed 29 crimes in 2014, as 
opposed to 32 the year before. In 2014, one U.S. Marine was arrested for rape, 
the charge was however dropped by Japanese prosecutors. No SOFA members 
were arrested for rape or other heinous crimes such as murder, robbery and 
arson in 2013. SOFA members arrested for crimes such as extortion or assault 
decreased from seven, the year before, to four.  
As compared to crime statistics over the past four decades, the trend for 
2014 are extraordinarily low, considering there are 50,000 personnel on Okinawa 
                                            
35 Matthew M. Burke and Chiyomi Sumida,Stars and Stripes, “Number of SOFA personnel 




offered legal protections under the U.S.- Japan SOFA. As further reported in the 
Stars and Stripes, “the number of arrests of SOFA personnel on Okinawa has 
steadily declined since peaking in 1977 with 396 arrests on 342 crimes, 
according to the data. There were 280 arrests in 1980, 74 in 1990, and 67 in 
2000.”36 
Overall, then, foreigners, USFJ military and civilians and U.S. Marine 
Corps personnel appear to have disproportionately lower rates of crimes and 
accidents when compared to mainland Japanese and Okinawa residents. 
D. PORTRAYALS OF SOFA-RELATED CRIME 
Despite these comparatively low crime rates, foreigners in Japan, 
including USFJ personnel protected under the SOFA, are often scapegoated in 
Japan’s crime reporting and serve as catalysts for “cracking down” on foreign 
crime. SOFA-covered personnel are both depicted as committing crimes at 
disproportionate rates and as too easily able to exploit SOFA provisions to evade 
justice. 
Japanese and foreign media often remark that Japan has a minimal crime 
rate. This is true when compared to most Western countries. The Japanese 
media, local-level interest groups and certain political factions in Okinawa and 
mainland Japan are quick to point out that the influx of immigrants and the 
presence of foreigners37 (particularly Chinese38 and Koreans) result in numerous 
robberies, assaults, rapes, and murders39 of Japanese citizens each year. When 
it comes to incidents involving the USFJ, separating fact from fiction is often very 
difficult.  
                                            
36 Ibid. 






Nowhere is the message of foreign crime louder or the burden markedly 
heavier than in Okinawa, where blame is typically placed on young USFJ service 
members. In the case of incidents involving the USFJ, negative reporting helps 
further the call to remove SOFA-sponsored military and civilian personnel and 
bases from Okinawa. 
In his 2008 article, “U.S. Military Crime: SOFA so good?” Michael Hassett 
argues that “members of the U.S. military are four times less-likely than a 
Japanese citizen to commit a crime on the island of Okinawa,” a claim that 
stands in sharp contrast to frequent countervailing claims that SOFA-covered 
personnel are disproportionately responsible for crime in Okinawa and Japan.40 
Hassett writes: 
Many feel that society would be great if we had no need for military 
forces, but as long as governments don’t feel the same way the fact 
remains that we have to put them somewhere. All of which raises 
the question: Is it hypocritical to give such disproportionate media 
exposure to crimes committed by U.S. service members when the 
data shows that their adherence to our laws apparently exceeds 
our own?41  
Arudo conveys Ellis and Hamai’s opinion that:  
The Japanese press . . . is presenting a partial and inaccurate 
picture of current crime trends, where  “the moral panic has had a 
very real effect . . . on public perception.” This is especially true 
since the Japanese public, like other societies, “rely more on media 
sources for opinions on crime than they do on objective sources.”42 
Figure 8, meanwhile, depicts the cover and back page illustrations of the 
米軍犯罪対応マニュアル or U.S. Military Crimes Victim Assistance Manual.43 
The front and back of the pamphlet show a hit-and-run by a SOFA member 
                                            
40 Hassett,  “U.S. Military Crime—SOFA so good?”  
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 U.S. Military Crimes Victim Assistance Manual (Osaka, Japan: U.S. Military Crimes Victim 
Assistance Center（米軍犯罪被害者救援センター), 2010.  
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(notice the “Y” license plate found on a SOFA member’s vehicle circled). There is 
reference to a PowerPoint briefing on CD in which the SOFA is said to operate 
as a “wall for victims.” There is also a Q&A section that begins with an 
explanation that the USFJ presence is not for the defense of Japan but instead 
part of a series of staging bases for worldwide U.S. engagements. 
 
Figure 8.  U.S. Military Crimes Victim Manual Cover 
(from Victim Assistance Center 2010) 
One recent report by the Ryukyu Shimpo, Okinawa’s first and largest 
newspaper, provides an example of the discrepancies that emerge in local 
reporting. The report holds that  
[o]f the 62 cases of crime or incidents involving U.S. military civilian 
employees in Japan that have occurred ”in the line of duty” [Table 
1] during the five-year period of 2006–2010, it was recently 
divulged that none of those have been brought to a court-martial, 
and 27 cases, or approximately 40% of those, were processed as 
being “not subject to punishment.” In 35 cases, disciplinary action 
against the suspected civilian employees was taken.44 
                                            
44 Hideki Matsudo, “No cases involving military civilian employees ‘on duty’ have been 
brought before a U.S. court martial in Japan,” Ryukyu Shimpo, November 13, 2011, 
http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/2011/11/22/3825/. 
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As shown in Table 1 and Figure 9, there were 35 cases against SOFA-
status civilians in which disciplinary action was taken. Key here is the use of the 
terms “military civilian” and “court martial” in the English-language Ryukyu 
Shimpo. The paper should have used the term “SOFA-status civilian” or even 
U.S. Government Civilian under SOFA-status” as other English-language 
Japanese newspapers have done in the past. The use of the term “military 
civilian” is confusing. The term used in the newspaper, 公務, is better translated 
as “public servant.”  
Table 1.   Cases Involving On-Duty USFJ Civilians, 2006–2010  
(from Matsudo, 2011) 
Cases Involving On‐Duty USFJ Civilian Civilians, 2006–2010 
Year Number of Cases 
Cases where SOFA 
member received 
disciplinary action 
Cases where SOFA 
member not subject to 
punishment 
2006 4 2 2 
2007 16 9 7 
2008 19 12 7 
2009 12 8 4 
2010 11 4 7 
Totals  62  35  27 
 
 
Figure 9.  Number of Cases Involving USFJ Civilian Personnel While 
On-Duty (2006–2010) (after Matsudo, 2011) 
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Furthermore, civilians or “public servants” do not receive a court martial. 
By definition, a court martial is “a judicial court for trying members of the armed 
services accused of offenses against military law.”45 Another key and misleading 
point is the use of the term “on-duty.” The average Japanese person may believe 
that active duty members of the U.S. military are always on-duty. It probably 
would not matter to most if a USFJ service member was on or off-duty if an 
incident were to occur.  
National-level legislators sometimes provide misleading accounts as well. 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) Member of the House of Councilors, Satoshi 
Inoue testified during a House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee 
meeting in November 2011 as to why the SOFA-status civilian employees were 
not brought to court martial: 
According to the explanation given by Inoue, the cases of crime 
and incidents involving U.S. civilians have mostly been traffic 
accidents. The U.S.–Japan Status of Forces Agreement states that 
in the case of the traffic accidents caused by U.S. military service 
members and civilians “on duty,” the primary jurisdictions over this 
is determined to be with the United States. Meanwhile, the results 
of the exercise of jurisdiction or disposal of cases by the U.S. 
military side after the Japanese side has given up jurisdiction have 
not so far been revealed.46 
As shown in Table 1, the data proves otherwise: the USFJ members did 
not commit nearly the number of incidents reported by the MOJ. By August 2012, 
however, the MOJ had yet to provide the data for incidents occurring during 2006 
and 2007, stating that it was unable to confirm the incidents due to a lack of data 
on the U.S. side. That statement is contradicted by data presented in this study. 
Additionally, not fully defining what constitutes “on-duty” and who receives a 
“court martial” is misleading. 
                                            
45 Jay M. Feinman, “One Thousand and One Legal Words You Need to Know” (New York: 
Oxford University Press; Reprint edition, 2005), 39.  
46 Matsudo, “No Cases Brought Before Court Martial in Japan.” 
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Matsudo of the Ryukyu Shimpo, when reporting on a Press Conference by 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Koichiro Gemba held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in February 2012 regarding the SOFA status and accidents and crimes 
committed by USFJ personnel during official duties, also conveyed the 
misleading notion that Japan cannot exercise jurisdiction over USFJ military and 
civilian personnel, though he was corrected by Gemba: 
Matsudo, Ryukyu Shimpo: This time a member of the civilian 
component was convicted. In the case of members of the U.S. 
armed forces, in many cases it is only the admonishment that is 
granted. Do you have any intention to consider Japan can exercise 
jurisdiction over members of the U.S. armed forces? 
Minister Gemba: As I said earlier, members of the U.S. armed 
forces and civilian components who commit a crime in the 
performance of official duty; this is not only in the SOFA between 
Japan and the United States but also in the agreements between 
the U.S. and other countries. If the act is done outside of their 
official duty, then Japan has jurisdiction. We have made 
improvements because of very strong requests from the people in 
Okinawa, we reviewed the SOFA. I would say that the Japanese 
Self Defense Forces were sent to Djibouti. In Djibouti, Japan has 
jurisdiction even over the act done not in the performance of official 
duty. Including all these things, we have to give it comprehensive 
consideration and I (Minister) would like to continue to think about 
what should be reviewed and at what time the review should be 
conducted.47 
Newspaper commentary, meanwhile, conveys misleading impressions 
about military personnel tendencies without countervailing opinion. For example, 
one Japan Times piece relates unchallenged that: 
The military has reduced violent crime, but everyday misdemeanors 
accumulate to strengthen Okinawan opposition. A Japanese lawyer 
wondered aloud to me why young, intoxicated servicemen feel entitled to 
                                            
47 Minister of Foreign Affairs Koichiro Genba’s reply to a question regarding the review of the 
implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement during the Foreign Affairs Press Conference, 
February 22, 2012.  
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enter the homes of residents late at night to sleep on the couch. “It 
happens frequently,” he said. “Some even plug in their cell phones.”48 
Another Japan Times piece holds that: 
Although under SOFA Japan nominally has jurisdiction over most U.S. 
personnel who violate Japanese law, in practice Japan either waives this 
jurisdiction or the U.S. simply does not hand the suspect over to local 
police for questioning. Indeed, there is nothing to stop the offender from 
being put on a U.S. plane out of the country, or to deter personnel who 
know they are shipping out from going on a petty crime spree immediately 
before doing so (the vast majority do not, of course).49 
A Ryukyu Shimpo piece offers the following regarding Okinawan 
fishermen and the USFJ on Okinawa: 
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in the waters 
provided for military use near White Beach in the Katsuren district, 
Uruma City, United States warships have pointed their deck guns 
toward local fishing vessels passing close by. The fishermen have 
been terrified to have U.S. Navy warships taking aim at them.50 
Similarly, as reported within Stars and Stripes reporting on Okinawan 
media bias: 
“The island’s two major newspapers—Ryukyu Shimpo and The 
Okinawa Times—are strongly antibase in their editorial stances and 
coverage of U.S.-Okinawa community relations,” the Cooley-Marten 
report states. “Each commands 200,000 readers, giving the 
antibase view great prominence.” It’s a claim the editor of The 
Okinawa Times denies. One U.S. officer said he was told by the 
editor of another newspaper that his paper’s editorial position was 
slanted against U.S. bases. “I was told straight out by an editor that 
                                            
48 G. Primo Ventello, “An Alliance of Hope Must Include Okinawans,” Japan Times, June 2, 
2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/06/02/commentary/japan-commentary/an-
alliance-of-hope-must-include-okinawans/#.VfsFF7RD1SU. 
49 Colin P.A. Jones, “SOFA: An Unequal Treaty that Trumps the Constitution?,” Japan 
Times, June 2, 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2013/08/05/issues/sofa-an-unequal-
treaty-that-trumps-the-constitution/#.VfuOD7TtKfQ. 
50 Kenyu Uchima, “Okinawan Fishermen Terrified to Have Guns Pointed Toward Them by 
U.S. Warships Near White Beach, Ryukyu Shimpo, September 11, 2011, 
http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/2011/09/22/2965/. 
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they want us—the military—to go away,” the officer said, asking not 
to be named.51 
[…] In a recent story in Marine Times, Lt. Gen. Richard Zilmer, the 
senior U.S. military officer on Okinawa, said a “vocal minority” of 
Okinawans and a “very, very anti-base media” at times portrays 
servicemembers as “criminals and thugs.”52 
The same Stars and Stripes article closed with commentary from 
University of the Ryukyus International Relations professor Masaaki Gabe:  
Okinawa officials will always use incidents involving SOFA-status 
personnel to ‘ensure Tokyo will provide economic incentives” for 
accepting the current plan to realign U.S. forces in Japan. The plan 
calls for the eventual transfer of some 8,000 Marines and their 
families to Guam. ‘Money is a very powerful, manipulative tool.’ And 
although the Okinawa press may be biased, Gabe said, it also 
represents the views of its readers.53 
More broadly, Professor Robert D. Eldridge of Osaka University has 
pointed to the Okinawan media’s tendency to compellingly report the “viewpoint 
of local residents, particularly under adverse conditions.” Eldridge further states 
that negative issues are incessantly reported without any coverage of news that 
casts the USFJ “in a favorable light,” and that this rightly contributes to claims of 
the Okinawan media being biased.54 
So why, if the data suggest otherwise, does the perception persist that 
USFJ members protected under the SOFA commit and get away with a 
disproportionate amount of crime? This study now turns to explanations for the 
overstatement of USFJ crime in Okinawa. 
 
                                            
51 David Allen and Chiyomi Sumida, “Okinawa’s Newspapers: At War with the U.S. 
Military?,” Stars and Stripes, May 11, 2008, http://www.stripes.com/news/okinawa-s-newspapers-
at-war-with-the-u-s-military-1.78673 
52 Allen, “Okinawa’s Newspapers: At War with the U.S. Military?”  
53 Ibid.  
54 Eldridge, “The Okinawa “Base Problem” Today.” 
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III. REPORTING FOREIGN CRIME IN JAPAN 
I argue, first, that the persistence of assumptions concerning 
disproportionate rates of crime among SOFA-covered personnel in Okinawa is 
reflective of a broader, nationwide reporting of high rates of non-Japanese crime, 
coupled with high rates of trust in Japanese media. 
In the late 1990s, after Japan’s bubble economy collapsed, the country 
found itself mired in an economic recession accompanied by a steep rise in 
crime. Later, during the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, Japan faced not only 
a worsening economy, but also a rising crime rate, according to Taisuke 
Kanayama of the Police Policy Research Center, NPA of Japan.55 After the 
Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, rumors blaming crimes on foreigners 
spread through Twitter and email exchanges.56 
The data relating to non-USFJ crimes found in Figures 10 through 13 and 
Figure 15, as well as examples of biased commentary, advertisements and news 
reports will be provided to establish the general climate of hyperbole of non-
Japanese crime.  
According to the author’s analysis, the economic quagmire Japan faced 
during the 1990s led to a steep increase in the total number of penal code crimes 
(from just over 1.5 million to almost 3 million, as shown on the Y axis) committed 
by both Japanese and non-Japanese criminals for seven consecutive years 
(1990 to 2002, as shown on the X axis), ultimately reaching a new post-war high 
(Figure 10).  
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The NPA reports 18 types of crimes via their annual report on crime and 
utilizes the number of crimes versus crimes as a percentage per capita. 
According to Hassett, in Japan, the arrest rate does not indicate whether a 
criminal case was prosecuted in Japanese court or whether a Japanese or non-
Japanese suspect was convicted of any crime.57 Hassett also reports that it 
serves as an indicator that a person was taken into custody by NPA.58  
 
Figure 10.  Number of Penal Code Crimes in Japan (1990–2002)  
(from Kaneyama, 2008)  
By 2002, the crime rate represented a 160 percent increase over the total 
crime reported in 1996 and led to the GOJ establishing a new national strategy in 
2003—the “Action Plan to Create a Crime Resistant Society” (APCCS2003)—
that would serve to mobilize all possible resources to fight crime in Japan. 
After 2002, the Japanese economy began to recover and the APCCS2003 
action—specifically in its second category stipulation, “Strengthening the 
Investigation of Crimes Committed by Foreign Nationals”—resulted in a decrease 
of illegal residents. In just five years, 2004 to 2008, the number of illegal aliens 
fell 48.4 percent from 219,000 to 113,000. Additionally, there was a 36.5 percent 
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drop in the number of foreign visitors arrested. The foreign tourist arrest rate 
plummeted from 21,842 in 2004 to 13,880 in 2008, as depicted in Figure 11.59  
 
Figure 11.  Number of Illegal Foreign Residents and Foreign Nationals 
Arrested or Charged with Crimes (1999–2008) 
(from Kaneyama, 2008)  
It is important to note that this portion of Kanayama’s APCCS study 
focused on “foreign nationals arrested or charged by the police not including 
foreigners who have permanent resident status and U.S. military personnel”60 
(more specifically, those under SOFA), according to the NPA.  
Figure 12 shows that the percentage of foreign nationals as a percentage 
of all arrested for robbery and burglary is high, as compared to all penal code 
crimes, which led the NPA to shift its resources to address the problem of crime 
committed by foreign arrestees.61 In 2008, for example, there were 2.2 million  
 
 
foreign residents living in Japan, according to the MOJ. Approximately 14,000 
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foreigners were arrested or charged with crimes (Figure 11). Two percent of 
foreigners represented all those arrested for penal code crimes with 
approximately 5.5 percent of that group being arrested for robbery and house 
burglary, respectively (Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12.  Percentage of Foreigners among Arrestees in Japan (1999–
2008) (from Kaneyama, 2008)  
As Zenn similarly reports in her NPS thesis, The Effects of Pacifist Norms 
of the Japanese Justice System: 
By 2008, the anti-organized crime laws and the APCCS along with 
improvements in the economy after the Asian Financial Crisis 
resulted in a 33% decrease in the crime rate since 2002. The 
boryokudan dominated criminal activities such as money 
laundering, stimulant offenses, and gun-related offenses decreased 






As crime took an upturn, the National Police Agency was also 
plagued with various scandals involving embezzlement and 
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clearance rate falsification.63 The NPA attempted to blame the 
increase in crime on foreigners and juvenile offenders, with minimal 
success, and growing dissatisfaction with the police grew 
throughout the public.64 
Overall, during the five-year duration of APCS2003, there was a 33 
percent reduction in crime. That equates to a drop of over a million penal code 
crimes as compared to 2002. Pleased with the results, the GOJ revised its initial 
strategy and implemented APCCS2008 referencing a remark by Franz Von Liszt, 
“A good social policy is the best and most effective criminal policy.”65 
The most recent crime statistics for 2012 (Figure 13) show that the crime 
rate has decreased and marks a successive eight-year decline in penal code 
offenses: 
The reported number of penal code offenses (excluding cases 
related to traffic accidents) was 1.38 million, a decrease of 98,639 
(6.7 percent) compared to the previous year. The proportion of 
thefts was the highest, accounting for approximately 75 percent, or 
1.04 million cases (down 8.2 percent from the previous year). The 
number of persons arrested for penal code offenses was 287,021 in 
2012, a decrease of 18,610 (6.1 percent) compared to the previous 
year, marking an eight-consecutive-year decline. The ratio of 
arrests to reported number of offenses marked a post-World War II 
low at 19.8 percent in 2001. Since 2002, however, it has shown 
signs of recovery, accounting for 31.7 percent in 2012.66 
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Figure 13.  Trends in Crime (from Statistical Handbook of Japan 2013)  
The APCCS2008 stressed the social conditions and other causes of 
crime. Doing so, allowed support for a broader and a more permanent crime 
prevention policy.67 According to Kanayama: 
APCCS2003 was a comprehensive plan for crime reduction that 
focused on suppressive and preventive measures. On the other 
hand, the more recent expansion of this into APCCS 2008 includes 
more fundamental policies for building a sound society. Although at 
first glance, these polices may seem more indirect, their purpose 
remains crime reduction and creation of a safe society and a sense 
of security for its citizens. Thus, it can be said that APCCS has 
developed from a policy plan focusing on crime prevention into a 
general social policy plan.68 
Katayama further explains that the narrative of items changed from 
measures taken against “crime and criminals to items that were more 
concentrated on society and potential victims of crime.”69  
                                            




Statistically, although it appears that APCCS2003 produced very 
impressive outcomes and APCCS2008 presented well-stated intentions in 
fighting crime and protecting citizens, this does not provide a full and accurate 
picture of the crime rate and crimes committed by foreigners in Japan, especially 
those foreigners protected under the SOFA.  
Michael Hassett reported in a 2006 Japan Times article that there was a 
total population of 127.77 million in Japan of which registered foreigners equaled 
2.08 million.70 Of those registered foreigners, Hassett says, 51,321 were non-
SOFA sponsored U.S. citizens, 96,790 were SOFA-sponsored and 
approximately 5 million tourists visited Japan of which 10 percent were 
American.71 
Additionally, Hassett also cites that the NPA 2006 report shows 384,250 
penal code offense arrests (for crimes such as assault, murder and theft, etc.) 
included 14,418 non-Japanese, 211 non-SOFA Americans and 120 SOFA-
covered personnel.72 Illegal immigrants comprised 13.2 percent of the foreign 
penal code offenses.73 Out of 83,147 individuals arrested for special law 
violations, 12,303 were non-Japanese, 84 non-SOFA Americans and 25 SOFA-
covered personnel, according to Hassett.74 
Hassett’s article further shows that the 2006 arrest rate equated to 0.351 
percent for Japanese. If one excludes the 13.2 percent of illegal immigrants 
assumed responsible in committing special law violations and those protected 
under the SOFA, a 0.326 percent arrest rate would be had and if tourists arrest 
rates are determined insignificant, the overall arrest rate for non-Japanese 
residents would jump to 1.1 percent.75 How do the Americans fare? In 2006, the 
                                            







arrest rate equated to 0.054 percent for American tourists and non-SOFA 
American residents in Japan.76  
It is also important to examine how the terms “foreigner” or “foreign 
national” are defined, and redefined, for statistical or political purposes, to 
understand crime reporting in Japan. To reassess the findings in the APCCS 
reports, the terms “foreign national” and what exactly constitutes “foreign crime” 
must be explained to check the validity of accuracy of the reported crime figures. 
According to Japan’s official immigration and police reports, “foreign nationals” 
are defined as those “foreign residents” (Figure 14) who stay in Japan on visas 
for a period of twelve months or longer. “Foreign nationals” may also be on short-
term visas (tourists, temporary workers) and even illegal immigrants. “Foreign 
nationals” do not include USFJ members protected under the SOFA. These 
distinctions may easily mislead since it is common in Japanese media reports of 
crime to use the term “foreigner” (gaikokujin). Some Japanese politicians and 
protest groups have been known to use “gaijin,” which also means “foreigner” but 
is considered less polite. When referring to USFJ personnel, the terms “beigun” 
(U.S. military) or “zainichibeigun” (USFJ) are also used. 




Figure 14.  Total Number of Foreigner Residents Registered 
(from Burrows, 2007) 
Therefore, defining what constitutes “foreign” crime in Japan can be 
difficult for those in Japan (both Japanese and non-Japanese) since the total 
number and percentages of crimes committed depend how “foreigner” is 
distinguished in official reports and the media. The media, depending on the 
intended audience, often uses the generic “foreigner” when describing those non-
Japanese (gaikokujin, gaijin, beigun, zainichibeigun), involved in crimes and 
accidents in Japan.  
Use of the term, foreigner, is misleading as it relates to USFJ military and 
civilian personnel (particularly those living in Okinawa), for example, as it gives 
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the Japanese the impression that USFJ personnel and their dependents commit 
the same types and rates of crime as non-USFJ foreign residents legally residing 
in Japan, visitors to Japan, and those foreigners illegally staying in Japan, 
whereas the opposite is true.  
Furthermore, the generic usage of the term foreigner when reporting 
crimes and crime rates, particularly with the lack of comparison between kokumin 
(Japanese citizens) and gaikokujin (foreigners) crime statistics with no 
juxtaposition between the two in breadth creates not only a false perception but 
also ungrounded expectations of crime. 
Figure 10 shows the yearly increase in the number of penal code crimes 
from 1990 to 2002 while Figure 15 illustrates the decrease in such crimes from 
2000 to 2009.  
 
Figure 15.  Penal Code Crimes 2000–2009 (from Kaneyama, 2008)  
In examining Figure 10 and Figure 15 in a wider context, the changes in 
rates of penal code crimes committed by foreigners do not account for an 
increased number of registered foreign nationals.  
In the May 2007 Kansai Time Out (KTO) magazine article, “Taking out the 
Trash,” Christian Burrows examined the foreign crime rate in Japan and reported 
that the National Police Agency showed the number of penal code crime cases 
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involving foreign nationals as having increased by approximately 50 percent, with 
32,033 cases occurring in 1997 to an estimated 48,000 in 2005 (Figure 16).  
 
Figure 16.  Crime Rate of Various Nationalities in Japan  
(from Burrows, 2007) 
A 50 percent increase in crime in a six-year period should have been and 
was a cause for alarm. However, the NPA failed to report that the registered 
foreign national population increased by almost a million persons to 1,281,644 in 
1992 and 2,011,555 in 2005. During the time of the report, non-Japanese 
residents accounted for 1.57 percent of the population, up .02 percent from the 
year prior and almost 2.5 times higher by percentage from 1987, as was shown 
in Figure 14.  
Based on this crime data, population discrepancies and clearance rate 
falsification, it appears that the accuracy of the NPA foreign crime reporting is 
questionable. Defining which type of foreigner (visitor, illegal immigrant, legal 
resident, temporary worker) actually committed the crime, and the yearly 
increase in the foreign population skews the results. For example, the two million 
foreign nationals registered by the MOJ in 2005 do not include visitors, illegal 
immigrants, and temporary workers. However, these categories are included in 
the “foreign-crime” statistics that the NPA published, as shown in Figure 16.  
Additionally, Kansai Time Out, when referring to the publication, Gaijin 
Hanzai Ura Fairu, or “The Secret Crime of Foreigners,” which focused on the 
crimes committed by foreigners and employed racist depictions and descriptions 
of those foreigners, claimed that 48,000 foreign nationals committed crimes in 
2005. Burrows writes, “Hyperbolic reporting of this type is also quite common 
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practice in mainstream media,”77 which tends to fixate on foreign crime 
regardless of more pressing issues (especially crimes committed by USFJ 
SOFA-status personnel, but not limited to them). 
Other media examples of targeting foreigners as disproportionately prone 
to crime include: 
 Japan’s best-selling locksmith, Miwa Locks’, Shuukan Asahi 
advertisement for their new “foreigner-proof” security.78 
 Tokyo Governor Ishihara’s urging the Nerima Self Defense Forces 
to round up illegal foreigners in case they unprecedentedly riot in 
the event of an earthquake.79 
 Sankei Shimbun front-page article, “Foreign Crime Rises Again, 
Six-Fold in Ten Years.”80 
 Sankei Shimbun’s publication of Tokyo Governor Ishihara’s essay 
connecting Chinese DNA with criminal tendencies and claiming that 
even the Yakuza (Japanese organized crime families) are scared of 
foreign-occupied zones.81 
 Fuji TV’s inaccurately describing South Koreans interviewed on the 
street as saying they “hate” Japan. The subtitle for a Fuji TV 
program read: “I hate Japan because it tormented Korea,” in an 
interview in which a high school girl on a street in Seoul is actually 
heard to say in Korean, “(South Korea) has a rich culture. I think 
that’s why many foreigners visit us.”82 
 Marco Polo magazine publishes a February 1995 article entitled 
‘Japan’s ‘Dark Society’ Whitepaper on Crimes by Foreigners, An 
All-Out Feature: Is it O.K. to Let This Matter Take its Course?’83 
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As made evident by the steadily decreasing crime rate, many Japanese 
still seem not to know that most recorded foreign crimes are for minor offenses—
alternatively, one might argue that many Japanese are unaware that crime rates 
by non-Japanese do not remain at their previously high rates. By using the adage 
“a crime is crime,” the Japanese media’s portrayal of the foreigner as a major 
threat to Japan-at-large has increased and sustained public fear. This type of 
fear and panic facilitates the continued discrimination and criminalization of 
foreigners, both military and non-military, residing in Japan. As discussed by 
Arudo: 
Suddenly Japan was no longer “safe.” Fortified by biannual NPA 
reports, the media periodically served up shock-horror headlines 
(for example, the Sankei Shimbun of April 1, 2000, exaggerating a 
“six-fold rise” in foreign crime). Politicians (and even the emperor) 
called for tightened public safety, blaming “a million foreign 
murderers and crooks” (former lawmaker Etoh Takami on July 12, 
2003) and “sneaky thieves” (Kanagawa Gov. Matsuzawa Shigefumi 
in December 2003). 
Open flew the tax purse strings: After Tokyo Gov. Ishihara claimed 
(with evidence unclear) that “even the yakuza are scared to enter 
lawless Kabukicho,” it became Japan’s first neighborhood with 
universal surveillance cameras. Likewise the NPA’s research 
institute landed boondoggle money for “foreign criminal DNA 
analysis” at crime scenes (Zeit Gist; Jan 13, 2004). Despite 
criticism from the United Nations, the Immigration Department 
launched online “snitch sites” (Zeit Gist; March 30, 2004), where 
anonymous xenophobes could rat on a foreigner for any reason 
whatsoever.84 
In the book Born to Crime (2002), Mary Gibson writes that “a succession 
of Moral Panics offered opportunities for interest groups to shape criminal justice 
policy.”85 It is possible that the Japanese press, certain GOJ organizations and 
protest groups have used such “moral panics” to incite fear as a means of social 
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control or to shape criminal justice policy. As Arudou points out, “media acts as a 
tool to build public’s confidence in and support to the government.”86 
In a New York Times article, Norimitsu Onishi argues that Japan’s “press 
club system, which was established in 1890, is used by government to control 
news and public opinion.”87 Tatsuya Iwase, author of The Reason Newspapers 
Are Not Interesting, posits: 
Japanese newspapers have little more than a formulaic recognition 
of the freedom of speech and ‘disregard the readers’ right to know.’ 
The public, he said, would eagerly welcome a new newspaper that 
carried feistier reporting and better analysis, but the system, from 
the government to the advertising powers, would do everything to 
prevent this.88 
Iwase further states that “newspapers here don’t write lies, but they avoid 
dealing with uncomfortable truths. Press club members loyally write articles 
within the framework.’’89 According to David T. Johnson, “The major national 
newspapers do little investigative reporting (contrast Yomiuri and Asahi with The 
New York Times or The Guardian).”90  
In an article discussing the danger of media bias in Okinawa, Eldridge 
writes: 
A great public debate has erupted recently about the role of the 
media in Japan: the nation as a whole, more broadly, and 
specifically about the plight of the “embattled” Okinawan media. In 
fact, though, the local media in Okinawa is very much at the center 
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and in many cases the cause of this controversy, due to its biased 
reporting and something I call “miss-information.” 
Biased reporting is of course a serious accusation. It can involve an 
intentional slant to stories, usually promoting a particular agenda 
while criticizing another, but can also be purposely not reporting 
events and perspectives that are found to be inconvenient to the 
chosen cause. Through this control of information, a certain 
narrative develops.91 
Even if Japanese media’s focus on foreigners’ culpability for crime hides 
no particular ulterior motive beyond selling advertising and newspapers, their 
message is likely to be effective. They are both trusted and widely consulted. 
According to Professor Koichi Hamai, Japanese citizens trust 90 percent of 
stories found in their newspapers and 80 percent of what they view on 
television.92 This compares to the 20 percent of Americans who conveyed a high 
trust in information found in printed news media and on television, according to 
Susan Pharr.93 Meanwhile, the Yomiuri Shimbun, the highest-circulation 
newspaper in Japan, also has the highest circulation in the world, with the 
morning edition of the paper alone boasting 10,180,98194 daily readers. This is 
almost the combined circulation (10,102,833)95 of America’s top ten daily 
newspapers. Japan’s second largest paper in the world, the Asahi Shimbun, has 
a combined morning and evening edition readership of 12,325,504.96 86 percent 
of the Japanese consume one or more of the daily 70,000,000 newspapers 
sold.97 This equates to the average household in Japan having a daily 
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newspaper subscription of approximately 1.1 newspapers.98 Considering the 
data presented above, one can comprehend how the Japanese can become 
extremely sensitive to reports of foreign crime. 
That sensitivity to foreign crime and particularly incidents involving USFJ 
personnel on Okinawa is heightened considering there are only three 
newspapers on Okinawa. According to Eldridge: 
The media’s irresponsibility, through both commission and 
omission, in reporting to date is made more severe in Okinawa due 
to the unapologetic antibase and antigovernment agenda, as well 
as the existence of a nearly closed media market in Japan’s 
southernmost prefecture.99 
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IV. THE OKINAWA MONDAI 
A. OKINAWA’S PERCEIVED BASE-COMMUNITY BURDENS 
A second set of factors that help explain Okinawan over-emphasis on 
foreign crime can be traced to the particular position of Okinawa itself—its unique 
position within Japan as a host community for U.S. bases, and the nature of the 
political and media environment that has resulted. Many Okinawa residents 
perceive the bases to impose a variety of burdens: reminders of Okinawa’s 
marginal historical position within Japan, confiscation of land, and accidents and 
environment impacts (in addition to the crimes otherwise at issue here). This 
perception of burden persists, at least among a significant part of Okinawa’s 
population, despite countervailing benefits in the form of support for the local 
economy (and, perhaps, the broader benefit of increased Japanese security). 
Related, though, the perception of burden gives rise to a political culture in which 
that burden, ironically, itself becomes a justification for governmental support and 
supports a political and media protest infrastructure. 
Calder defines base politics as “the interaction between ‘basing nations’ 
and “host nations’ on matters relating to the status and operations of local military 
facilities in the host nations, together with related transnational interactions 
involving non-state actors.” The actors involved in the base politics in Okinawa 
are the U.S. military, Government of Japan (GOJ) and Okinawa Prefectural 
Government (OPG).100 Cooley states, “the single most explosive issue that 
drives anti-Americanism in Japan revolves around U.S. forward bases in 
Okinawa, Japan, base politics.”101 
As Robert Eldridge indicated in “‘The Okinawa ‘Base Problem’ Today”:’ 
Remarkably little progress has been made over the years to 
overcome the “Okinawa problem”—a catch all label for the host of 
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unresolved issues between the prefecture and the Japanese and 
U.S. governments. The U.S. military bases in Okinawa, in 
particular, have been at the heart of the controversy.102 
According to Lisa Takeuchi Cullen, “Okinawa hates America, and Okinawa 
loves America. Okinawa is in fact so American that it can appear deceptively like 
home.”103 
Many Okinawans have lingering and uneasy ties with mainland Japan 
since they have not forgotten the bloody Battle of Okinawa in 1945, which killed 
approximately a third of the Okinawan population.104 The U.S. military 
maintained administrative authority of the Ryukyu Islands from 1945–1972. The 
United States transferred Okinawa back to Japan on May 15, 1972, when 
Okinawa once again became a prefectural district. The continued U.S. military 
presence on the island and the GOJ’s seeming ambivalence toward the people 
of Okinawa remains a source of major friction.105 Many Okinawans feel that the 
U.S.–Japan security arrangement mainly benefits Japanese citizens outside of 
Okinawa.106 
The U.S. bases in Okinawa have always been under an intense degree of 
scrutiny by the OPG due to ongoing issues such as crimes, accidents, pollutants, 
noise hazards and location.107 But also important is that Marine Corps Air Station 
(MCAS) Futenma (Figure 17.) occupies prime land leased for military use. 
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Figure 17.   MCAS Futenma (from Ginowan City, 2012) 
The Japanese Diet has overridden the rights of Okinawan citizens to 
reclaim their land. Article VI of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty sets forth Japan’s 
obligation to expropriate land from private land users for U.S. military basing.108 
Calder explains that Okinawa is Japan’s poorest prefecture and accounts 
for 0.6 percent of the total land mass in the nation. In looking at Okinawan 
landlords and their rents received in 2008, Phillip Brasor reported in Japan 
Times: 
The total amount of money paid to these “landlords” in 2008 was 
6.5 billion yen. That’s about 8 percent of all the rent paid to all 
34,000 landlords on Okinawa. To put this in perspective, the 
American military controls about 20 percent of Okinawa’s land area 
(though it only occupies 11 percent), and rent property accounts for 
2 percent of Okinawa prefectural production (tourism accounts for 
about 10 percent). Moreover, only 8 percent of the landlords who 
get money from the bases receive more than 5 million a year. More 
than half the landlords receive less than a million yen, which means 
most landlords don’t make a living from the bases.109 
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Many Okinawans want their land back. With the obvious strategic benefits 
that a forward-deployed U.S. military presence offers the United States and in 
bolstering the strength of the U.S.–Japan alliance, efforts to eliminate or reduce 
the Okinawan Mondai have been a dilemma for both the United States and 
Japan. The dilemma for the United States is losing basing rights and a 
degradation of force readiness while the GOJ faces intensifying pressure from 
the local municipal governments to reduce, or as is the case in Okinawa, remove 
the USFJ presence entirely. 
Robert Eldridge writes: 
In response, the Japanese and U.S. governments set up the 
Special Action Committee on Okinawa, or SACO, to formulate 
measures for realigning the U.S. military forces in Japan and 
alleviating the burden on Okinawa. One such measure was the 
April 1996 agreement to relocate U.S. Marine Corps Air Station 
Futenma from its urban site in Ginowan, just outside of Naha.110 
The SACO has had mixed success, especially when considering the spate 
of USFJ incidents and the ongoing issues with the MCAS Futenma relocation 
and the return of previously leased land in Okinawa. Removing or relocating 
MCAS Futenma and returning leased land weighs heavily on the U.S. keeping its 
promise to help reduce the burden in Okinawa. According to the Japan’s Ministry 
of Defense (MOD): 
The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land, the 
adjustment of training and operational procedures, the 
implementation of noise-reduction initiatives, and the improvement 
of operational procedures regarding the Status of Forces 
Agreement; the facilities and areas concerned are shown in Figure 
III-2–3-1. The land to be returned based on the SACO Final Report 
represents approximately 21 percent (about 50 km2) of USFJ 
facilities and areas in Okinawa at that time, exceeding the amount 
of land returned during the period between the reversion of 
Okinawa and the implementation of the SACO Final Report, which 
is roughly 43 km2.111 
                                            
110 Eldridge, Okinawa ‘Base Problem’ Today. 
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B. POLITICAL AND MEDIA INFRASTRUCTURE: “CONFLICT PAYS”  
The OPG and residents of Okinawa, two strong voices that have 
developed a deep reliance on military-related spending, face a complex situation. 
Okinawan base-related revenue sources, next to tourism, comprised five to 
seven percent of Okinawa’s entire local economy.112 The landowners conflicting 
incentive to rent their land to host USFJ and JSDF bases while their fellow 
citizens call for the removal of U.S. military bases from the island further 
complicates the domestic political situation on Okinawa. 
To further examine 2011 data presented by the OPG regarding Okinawa’s 
base-related revenue received, it was reported: 
At the time of Okinawa’s Reversion to Japan in 1972, U.S. Forces-
related revenue was 15.5% of the gross prefectural income. In 
2008, this ratio decreased to 5.3%. In contrast, the tourism revenue 
increased from 6.5% in 1972 to 10.9% in 2008, which is more than 
twice the U.S. Forces-related revenue. 
Okinawa’s present economy is not as dependent on base-related 
revenue as before. The return of bases located in the central and 
southern regions of Okinawa Island has resulted in positive 
economic effects of approximately 10–200 times in comparison to 
pre-return, and has had great impacts on the prefecture’s economy 
and employment.113 
When looking at the graph in Figure 18, it may be concluded that 
Okinawa’s present economy is not as dependent on the USFJ as in the past. 
However, it should be remembered that military spending on Okinawa 
contributes approximately three times more to the local economy than the 
island’s fishing, agriculture and forestry industries combined. An additional $475 
million comes from outlay by the USFJ service men and women and their 
                                            
112 Military Base Affairs Division, Okinawa Prefectural Government, “US Military Base Issues 
in Okinawa,” June 2011 (accessed September 24, 2011), 
http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/contents/attach/24600/2011.6%20Eng.pdf. 
113 Military Base Affairs Division, U.S. Military Base Issues in Okinawa. 
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dependents, including off-base housing rent, worker salaries at base and post 
exchanges and more than $1.6 million in personal telephone calls.114  
 
Figure 18.  USFJ-Related Gross Prefectural Revenue (from OPG, 2011)  
With the current U.S. and GOJ plan to close bases south of Kadena Air 
Base (particularly MCAS Futenma) and move U.S. Marines to current and 
planned facilities in Guam in the very near future, it is estimated the move will 
likely “eliminate about 10,000 jobs on the island and dig a billion-dollar hole in the 
Okinawa economy.”115 The OPG may feel that the job loss is negligible since 
previous base closures and land return in Okinawa has resulted in exponential 
economic returns, as shown in Figure 19. 
 
 
                                            
114 Ibid. 
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Figure 19.  Direct Economic Effects of U.S. Base Closures in Okinawa 
(from OPG, 2011) 
Additionally, for those involved in base politics in Okinawa (USFJ, GOJ 
and OPG), “conflict pays” and adds to Okinawa’s coffers, via the compensation-
politics paradigm. Calder’s definition of base politics as “the interaction between 
‘basing nations’ and ‘host nations’ on matters relating to the status and 
operations of local military facilities in the host nations, together with related 
transnational interactions involving non-state actors” should be kept in mind .116 
Japan provides over $4 billion dollars annually in host-nation support for the 
USFJ.117 In looking at the perspective of base politics specifically, most of those 
funds are allocated to pay local-level interest groups that provide assorted base 
services, and, according to Calder, it “addresses those disadvantaged or injured 
by the bases, through accidents, noise pollution, or criminal activity, for 
                                            
116 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 65. 
117 Gavan McCormack, New Left Review, Vol. 64, “Obama vs Okinawa,” July-August 2010, 
http://newleftreview.org/II/64. 
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example—are provided for through timely case-specific allocation.”118 Reports of 
USFJ members committing a disproportionate amount of crime in Japan, 
especially in Okinawa, may be politicized for the benefit of gaining advantage in 
the removal or relocation of USFJ military facilities in Okinawa and mainland 
Japan, but they also produce side benefits in the absence of progress toward 
removal or relocation. 
Even if basing rents do not provide windfall income, their impact can also 
be interpreted as significant. As noted previously, Okinawa remains Japan’s 
poorest prefecture, accounts for 0.6 percent of Japan’s total land mass, and is 
host to 75 percent of the U.S. military facilities in Japan (Figure 20). There are 34 
distinct U.S. military facilities occupying 18.4 percent of the island with a “full 67 
percent of the land used for military facilities privately owned,” and the prefecture 
has “more than 32,000 ‘contract’ landowners” receiving $562 million in rental 
income in 2003,119 and about $706 million in rent in 2006 paid to 33,309 
individuals and municipal governments.120 In comparison, less than 10 percent of 
the base land in mainland Japan is leased from private individuals. According to 
the OPG, rent increases yearly. The rent paid by the GOJ to military landowners 
located on Okinawa increased by 23.2 percent in the past 10 years. 
 
                                            
118 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 130. 
119 Calder, Embattled Garrisons, 171.  




Figure 20.  Map of USFJ Installations on Okinawa  
(from Military Base Affairs, 2015) 
Okinawa’s media also may be thought to benefit, ironically, from the 
prominence—not necessarily the resolution—of crime and other military-burden 
issues. The penetration of national news is very small on Okinawa. The two 
influential newspapers, the Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, generally do not 
carry a positive view of the USFJ. These two publications, along with their 
television affiliates, hold more than 80 percent of the local media market, and 
groups such as the Okinawa High School Teachers Union, with a strong anti-
base bias121 give disparate media exposure to USFJ personnel crimes. As 
Eldridge asserts:  
                                            
121 Gavan McCormack, “Deception and Diplomacy: The US, Japan, and Okinawa,” The 
Asian-Pacific Journal, Vol. 9, Issue 21, No. 1, May 23, 2011, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Gavan-
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Many of the problems with the ‘Okinawa problem’ are therefore 
ones of ‘omission’ rather than ‘commission.’ In other words, 
arguments go unchallenged, ‘facts’ unexamined, and opportunities 
unexplored.122 
According to Kadena Public Affairs Officer (PAO) Major Christopher Anderson, 
both the Okinawa Times and Ryukyu Shimpo “have a mission to reduce the 
presence of U.S. military on Okinawa. This is their stated objective that is written 
on their wall for all to see when we visited their offices.”123 
An example of biased media is the Okinawa Times’ announcing a boycott 
of a scheduled test flight of the U.S. Marine Corps Osprey aircraft scheduled to 
be based at MCAS Futenma in Okinawa and MCAS Iwakuni in mainland Japan 
as shown in Figure 21.124  
 
Figure 21.  Okinawa Times Osprey Article (from Okinawa Times, 2012)  
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It is difficult to provide a fair and balanced report of the aircraft if an 
outright refusal by the local media to participate in familiarization flights is the 
response. 
Okinawa Times Not Participating in the Ride: Okinawa Times 
indicated that they are not participating in the orientation ride 
scheduled on September 27 at Iwakuni citing that their participation 
would not prove the safety of the aircraft and fear of groundless 
information to be fed to the readers.125 
Editor Taketomi of Okinawa Times released his comments indicating the 
following: 
‘With recurrence of accidents, we cannot make judgment on the 
safeness of the Osprey just by riding on it. Out of concern that we 
would be providing official information to the citizens that ‘Osprey is 
safe’ with the participation of our reporters, we decided not to 
participate.126 
This conflict-acceptant stance, combined with the general high degree of 
Japanese trust in media noted above, endows Okinawan media with a great deal 
of influence. As Stavale contends, 
The Japanese media, particularly on Okinawa, warrant attention, as 
they are likely to degrade the views toward U.S. forces. ‘The 
influence of the press on Japanese public opinion and also on 
political circles is substantial…’127 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The Japanese media’s spotlight on the increasing amount of foreign crime 
in general across Japan is well established. This thesis has argued that the 
Japanese media’s often ascribes disproportionate weight to accidents and crimes 
committed by USFJ military and civilian SOFA-status personnel, and in turn 
discussed factors that might contribute to this outcome. It is a consequential 
outcome, with ultimately negative repercussions on the U.S.–Japan relationship 
and America’s posture in Asia. The 1995 kidnapping and gang rape of a 12-year-
old Okinawan girl by two U.S. Marines and a sailor, for example, has been one of 
biggest catalysts of resentment toward the United States and has resulted in one 
of the worst situations in the U.S.–Japan security relationship since the Anpo 
Riots of the early 1960s, which led to the resignation of Japan’s Prime Minister 
Nobusuke Kishi and caused President Eisenhower to cancel his state visit to 
Japan.128 Rancor arising from an extreme incident like this may be well-
deserved, but it also creates an environment in which less-deserved attention for 
general crime rates becomes even more unproductive. Although environmental, 
noise and land-use issues remain (and were not presented in detail in this 
thesis), the GOJ, NPA and USFJ crime data clearly illustrates that USFJ SOFA-
status personnel commit far less crime in Japan than publicized. The notion that 
the U.S. military commits a disproportionate amount of crime in Japan seems 
misguided. 
Unfortunately, bias against the USFJ will persist as long as negative 
reporting plays into base politics. Media, interest groups and influential 
individuals may continue to present skewed crime statistics and misinterpret the 
language found in the SOFA and other agreements between the United States 
and Japan to further their own agendas. In other words, the press will continue to 
mislead the public.  
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The resulting friction, often demonstrated via protests such as the one 
depicted in Figure 22 and commonly referred to as the Okinawa Mondai or 
(Okinawa Problem), must be greatly reduced, if not altogether alleviated, by 
properly addressing the concerns of the Okinawan people and implementing 
solutions to ease the burden of hosting U.S. forward-deployed forces and to 
sustain one of America’s most valuable and strategic alliances in Asia with 
Japan.  
 
Figure 22.  Okinawans Protest MV-22 Osprey Helicopters  
(from Chris Willson, 2012) 
What can the U.S. do about this? The probability that a change in 
Okinawa’s negative mindset will occur is high if the USFJ can “get ahead of the 
narrative” and present bilingual data and news derived from various viewpoints to 
supplement the “viewpoint of local residents, particularly under adverse 
conditions.”129 This can lead to better community relations between the U.S. 
military and those affected by USFJ incidents. Such data can serve as a 
resource to provide clarity to counter sometimes-unwarranted negative reporting 
by local media. 
                                            
129 Stavale, The Evolution of Japan’s Constitution. 
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To better inform the local community and USFJ personnel, the USFJ and 
Department of State must openly address (in both English and Japanese) the 
negative perceptions that the Japanese and Okinawans have of USFJ SOFA-
sponsored members. This can be accomplished by providing easily accessible 
sources of information via bilingual websites, mobile devices, mobile apps and 
local media that can counter inaccuracies in crime and accident reporting.  
The USFJ should also implement an intensive campaign to regain local 
public support. This can be done by increasing the number of on-base special 
events that the local population can attend, increase off-base community 
programs and partnerships, launch additional sister-city relationships, creating 
additional dialogue with local officials and promoting or increasing, if applicable, 
joint patrols or “kobans” manned by both junior and senior USFJ service 
members along with local law enforcement and citizens’ groups. 
By openly reporting overall accidents and crimes in both English and 
Japanese and understanding that any incident may become a major issue 
between the USFJ and the local community (particularly the residents of 
Okinawa), the USFJ and, ultimately, the U.S.–Japan Security Alliance will be 
strengthened. Negative views may slowly and methodically be mitigated as the 
local community and USFJ personnel grow better informed.  
Keeping the local civilian and USFJ community better informed will also 
help refute negative media reporting and provide a counterbalance to those that 
disseminate false information. This could be as simple as reexamining the 
common theme (repeated in this study itself) that 75 percent of U.S. military 
bases are hosted on Okinawa. As presented by Toshio Ohama, spokesman for 
the Okinawa Teachers Union in a Japan Times Online interview, “strengthening 
cooperation between the U.S. military and Okinawa police is a good thing. But 
that doesn’t change the fact that Okinawa still hosts 75 percent of the U.S. bases 
in Japan, a disproportionate figure.”130 
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As Eldridge writes: 
This percentage is not true for two reasons: first, if ‘U.S. bases’ 
means ‘all U.S. bases’ then the percentage is approximately 24%; 
second, if ‘U.S. bases’ is meant as ‘U.S. exclusive use bases’ then 
the percentage is not 75% but closer to 62%. This is because two-
thirds of the Central Training Area, located in the central and 
northern parts of Okinawa, is used jointly with the Ground Self-
Defense Force. 
In fact, if the SACO agreement were implemented, which includes 
the return of 51% of the Northern Training Area and MCAS 
Futenma, the percentage of exclusive use facilities in Okinawa 
would be reduced to about 49%. Moreover, if the 2006 base 
realignment plan known as the ‘Roadmap’ were realized, then that 
figure would drop even further to 42%. This number is a lot less 
than the 75% commonly used. Sadly, however, moving forward on 
any of the agreements is out of U.S. hands. It is entirely a domestic 
issue in Japan.131 
With the OPG and groups in Okinawa calling for the revision of the U.S.–
Japan SOFA, there is an apparent or feigned lack of understanding surrounding 
the agreement. As Nye pointed out when discussing crimes and those U.S. 
military and civilian personnel that commit them, “the Japanese SOFA itself is 
probably the best from the point of view of the host nation of any SOFAs we 
have. We hand over to Japan more than two-thirds of the cases and in Germany 
it has been one-tenth of one percent, and in the last year, not at all.”132 It is 
imperative that the USFJ use every opportunity to present the facts surrounding 
USFJ incidents and explain how the SOFA applies in such situations.  
At the tactical level, it is important for USFJ military commanders and 
those that they command to have a broad view and good understanding of the 
impact of USFJ crimes and accidents. This will help ensure that every possible 
step is taken to thwart incidents from occurring or recurring. At the strategic level, 
the United States should take rapid and proactive versus reactive actions to 
mitigate damage to public opinion and ultimately U.S. foreign policy goals. It is 
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well-documented that U.S. Forces Japan military and civilian personnel do not 
commit a disproportionate amount of crime in Japan. This fact should be used to 
revalidate positive community contributions, participations and interfaces in order 
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